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The social cost of carbon (the SCC) estimates the discounted value of the damage associated with 
climate change impacts that would be avoided by reducing carbon emissions by one tonne.  It is a 
useful measure for assessing the benefits of climate policy at any point in time.  It is generally thought 
to increase over time, and textbook economics would recommend that carbon emissions be taxed by a 
price set equal to the SCC.  The Stern Review18-20 reported a SCC in excess of $300/tC in the absence 
of any climate policy – an estimate that lies well above the upper bound of $50/tC that was found in an 
extensive literature survey and meta-analysis26.  Many analysts have attributed this high estimate to the 
very low rate of pure time preference adopted by the Stern author team1,11,13,14,30.  
Others5,29 have argued that the Stern Review also included unusual assumptions about risk 
aversion.  We respond to this observation by exploring the relative sensitivity of the SCC to both the 
pure rate of time preference and the rate of risk aversion.  Our results support the hypothesis that the 
assumed rate of risk aversion is at least as important as the assumed rate of time preference in 
determining the social cost of carbon even though our analysis reveals an enormous range of estimates.  
Some are negative (that is, showing social benefits), but our positive estimates span six orders of 
magnitude on the positive side depending on both the pure rate of time preference and a standard 
measure of risk aversion.  
Philosophers would likely confront this range by choosing a particular estimate based on what 
they deemed to be appropriate reflections of both parameters3,4,12,15. This approach was adopted in the 
Stern Review, but here we take a different tact.  Instead of imposing our own normative values on the 
selection of a single SCC estimate, we look at the behaviours of democratically elected governments to 
infer distributions of the rates of risk aversion and pure time preference that are actually used in 
practice. We use the resulting probability density to constrain the estimates of the SCC and compute its 
expected value.  Perhaps surprisingly, the expected social cost of carbon turns out to be reasonably 
close to the value reported in the Stern Review. 
To be sure, climate change is a long-term problem. This is why the pure rate of time preference 
is so important.  Greenhouse gas emission reduction over the near-term would mitigate future 
damages, but they would do little to alter the present climate and/or the present rate of change in 
climate impacts. The costs of emission abatement must therefore be justified by the benefits of avoided 
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impacts in the future. It follows that any statement about the desirability of climate policy necessarily 
contains a value judgement about the importance of future gains relative to present sacrifices. The 
discount rate employed in benefit and cost calculations over time can be thought of as the opportunity 
cost of investment, but it can also be seen as the relative value of consumption over time.  The two are 
equivalent if the economy is in a dynamic equilibrium; and this equivalence means that time 
preference is not alone in playing a critical role in determining any SCC estimate.  
To explain why, we note that people discount future consumption for two reasons.  Firstly, they 
expect to become richer in the future, and so they care less about an additional dollar then than they do 
about an additional dollar today.  Secondly, they are impatient.  We also recall the so-called Ramsey 
discount rate r that was designed to sustain optimal saving over time16. It consists of three components:  
(1) r gρ η= +  
where ρ is the rate of pure time preference, g is the growth rate of per capita  consumption, and η is the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.  
Both motives of personal discounting can be detected in the Ramsey rule for dynamic 
optimality by considering the rate at which people would be willing to sacrifice a dollar of current 
consumption for additional consumption in the future (see the SOM for brief details). The pure rate of 
time preference is defined implicitly by the marginal rate of substitution between present and future 
consumption under the condition that consumption levels in both periods are equal (so that g = 0).  In 
words, the definition of the pure rate of time preference calibrates inter-temporal trading so that 
individuals who anticipate constant levels of consumption from one period to the next would be 
willing to sacrifice one dollar of present consumption if he or she would be compensated with $(1 + ρ) 
of extra consumption  in the next period. Higher values of ρ therefore reflect higher degrees of 
impatience because higher compensation would be required to compensate exactly for the loss of $1 in 
current consumption. 
Consumption levels need not be constant over time, and the second term in Eq (1) works the 
implication of this fact into this trading calculus.  While g measures the growth rate of material 
consumption, ηg reflects the growth rate of happiness measured in terms of underlying personal utility.  
If consumption were to climb by g · 100% from one period to the next, then each future dollar would 
be worth g · η  · 100% less (assuming no impatience so ρ ≡ 0).  It follows that our individual would 
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consider sacrificing one dollar in current consumption only if he or she could be compensated by an 
amount equal to $(1 + gη) in the future.   
In contemplating welfare-based equivalence of consumption over time, it is now clear that this 
trading-based accommodation of growing consumption works in exactly the same way as the pure rate 
of time preference in defining the rate at which the future needs to be discounted.  Put another way, if 
one considered empirical estimates for both ρ and η that range from zero to three, then both parameters 
should play equally important roles in determining the appropriate discount rate.  Perhaps because 
“impatience” is intuitively clear while the role of the “elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption” is not, the debate over how the SCC could be so high has focused undue attention over ρ 
almost to the exclusion of η. 
This need not be the case; indeed, the utility-based association with the Ramsey discounting 
rule shows that this should not be the case. Climate change is not only a long-term problem; it is also a 
very uncertain problem and a problem that differentially affects people with widely different incomes. 
The rate of pure time preference ρ speaks only to the first characteristic of the climate policy problem 
– the time scale issue.  The elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, the parameter η, 
speaks to all three characteristics.   It is, first of all, a measure of the curvature of the utility function, 
which maps material consumption to happiness. It indicates precisely the degree to which an additional 
dollar brings less joy as income increase.  Moreover, the parameter η can also be interpreted as a 
measure of how one evaluates a gain of a dollar for rich person relative to a gain of a dollar for a poor 
person.  This is why η is occasionally referred to as the parameter of inequity aversion.  At the same 
time, curvature in the utility function can be viewed as a reflection of risk aversion.  In this role, η 
explains why risk-averse people buy insurance; they are willing to pay a premium that is proportional 
in first order approximation to the parameter η to eliminate variability in outcomes because doing so 
increases their expected utility.1  
Armed with these insights from the first principles of microeconomic theory, we used the 
integrated assessment model FUND to test the hypothesis that η could actually turn out to be more 
 
1  The risk premium is, by definition, the difference between the expected outcome of a risky situation and the “certainty 
equivalent” outcome – the guaranteed outcome that would sustain a level of utility equal to expected utility across the full 
range of possible outcomes.  For a risk averse individual, the certainty equivalent is always less than the mean because 
losses relative to the mean reduce utility more than equal gains above the mean.  
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important in determining the SCC than ρ.  In many ways, FUND is a standard integrated assessment 
model9,21,22,27.  It has simple representations of the demography, economy, energy, emissions, and 
emission reduction policies for 16 regions.  It has simple representations of the cycles of greenhouse 
gases, radiative forcing, climate, and sea level rise.  In other ways, though, FUND is unique.  It is 
alone in the detail of its representation of the impacts of climate change.  Impacts on agriculture, 
forestry, water use, energy use, the coastal zone, hurricanes, ecosystems, and health are all modelled 
separately – both in “physical” units and their monetary value23,24.  Moreover, FUND allows 
vulnerability to climate change impacts to be an explicit function of the level and rate of regional 
development25,28. See the SOM for more details on the model.  
We estimated the SCC cost of carbon by computing the total, monetised impact of climate 
change along a business as usual path and along a path with slightly higher emissions between 2005 
and 2014.  Differences in impacts were calculated, discounted back to the current year, and normalised 
by the difference in emissions. The SCC is thereby expressed in dollars per tonne of carbon at a point 
in time – the standard measure of how much future damage would be avoided if today’s emissions 
were reduced by one tonne.  More details on FUND are provided in the SOM.2 
We estimated the SCC for a range of values for ρ and η, but we report our results in stages to 
highlight the triple role of η.  We first consider results for cases in which η affected only the discount 
rate. That is, we pretended that uncertainty about climate change had been resolved and that income 
differences between countries were irrelevant.  The second set of results put uncertainty back into the 
problem; the reported expected values of the SCC are the product of a Monte Carlo analysis of all the 
uncertain parameters in the FUND model.  A third batch of results were drawn from the original world 
of perfect climate certainty, but social cost estimates applied equity weighting to climate-driven 
globally distributed differences in income.  Finally, we report expected social cost estimates for cases 
in which both uncertainty and equity-weighing play a role – the cases where η plays its theoretically 
appropriate triple role. 
Figure 1 shows the SCC cost of carbon for the four cases, varying both ρ and η while Figure 2 
portrays various cross-sections.  If we ignore concerns about equity and uncertainty (Panel A), the 
SCC roughly decreases with the discount rate.  For ρ = η = 0, SCC = $1,939/tC; it falls to SCC = 
 
2 Full documentation of the FUND model is available at http://www.fund-model.org. 
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$10/tC for ρ = η = 1 and to SCC = -$5/tC for ρ = η = 2.  The sign changes because climate change is 
initially beneficial to the world economy.  For ρ = η = 3, however, SCC climbs back to -$4/tC because 
the discount rate is so high that it even discounts initial benefits significantly. 
The profiles change when uncertainty is taken into account.  Panel B shows that a maximum is 
still observed where ρ = η = 0 and the expected social cost of carbon, denoted E(SCC) equals 
$2,036/tC.  This is a local maximum, though.  E(SCC) falls monotonically as ρ increases.  E(SCC) also 
falls initially as η (and thus the discount rate) increases, but it starts rising as a greater η values puts 
more emphasis on the tail of the distribution.  For ρ = 0 and η = 3, E(SCC) = $152,155/tC.  E(SCC) is 
negative only for ρ ≥ 2.7% and 1.10 ≤ η ≤ 2.25. 
Panel C shows that the results are different again with equity weighing2,8 and no uncertainty.  
For ρ = η = 0, SCC = $1,939/tC; since η = 0 implies equal weights, this is the global maximum.  A 
local maximum appears at SCC = $122/tC when ρ = 0 and η = 3.  Since this maximum is smaller than 
the expected social cost reported above for the second set of values for ρ = 0, η = 3, we see that 
uncertainty is a bigger concern for climate policy than equity, at least in terms of an aggregate measure 
like the SCC.  A global minimum is observed when ρ = η = 3 and SCC = -$50/tC.  It emerges because 
CO2 fertilization brings short-term benefits even to poor countries that will be hurt by climate change 
in the longer term.  For these parameters, long-term losses are heavily discounted and short-term 
benefits in developing countries are emphasized. See the Supplementary Online Material for the case 
without CO2 fertilization. 
Estimates of expected social cost are similar when equity weighting is added to the 
complication of uncertainty.  Panel D reflects is a local a maximum at ρ = η = 0 as before where 
E(SCC) = $2,036/tC, but the global maximum is E(SCC) = $120,977/tC at ρ = 0, η = 3.  E(SCC) is 
lowest for a high ρ and a medium η; E(SCC) = $9/tC, for example, at ρ = 3.0%, η = 0.90.  Note that 
the E(SCC) is strictly positive for this, the theoretically correct scenario. 
For reference, Lord Stern of Brentford chose ρ = 0.1%, η = 1; in our calibration through 
FUND, the result was E(SCC) = $721/tC.  Since the Stern Review essentially ignored equity weighing, 
though, E(SCC) = $333/tC is a more comparable statistic.  The Stern Review estimate E(SCC) = 
$314/tC, which is remarkable close. However, note that the Review used the PAGE10 model – which 
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truncates the tails of distributions of input parameters, that FUND fully recognizes3, but keeps 
vulnerability to climate change as in 1995 while FUND has vulnerability declining with development 
– the two main differences between the two models roughly offset one another. 
We used two different approaches to inform our representations of combinations ρ and η that 
reflect actual practice across decision-makers. In the first, we worked with results from Evans and 
Sezer6,7, who estimated η = 1.49 ± 0.19 for 22 rich and democratic countries from income 
redistribution data17. They also independently estimated ρ = 1.08 ± 0.20 using data on mortality rates.  
Assuming normality, these results support the probability density function on ρ and η displayed in 
Panel A of Figure 3.  The first row of Table 1 records estimates of the expected value of the SCC 
derived from this distribution for the four cases described above (see Supplementary Online Material 
for details).  Ignoring concerns about equity and uncertainty, E(SCC) = -$1/tC. Considering either 
equity or uncertainty alone increases the estimate to 13/tC or 62/tC, respectively. Uncertainty is again 
seen to play a larger role in determining the social cost of carbon than equity. Considering both equity 
and uncertainty produces the fourth estimate: E(SCC) = $210/tC. Equity and uncertainty reinforce one 
another. 
Our second approach relied data on per capita consumption growth rates, inflation rates, and 
nominal interest rates for 27 OECD countries from 1970 to 2006.  We interpreted observations of the 
real interest rate (r in equation (1) and the difference between the nominal rate and the rate of inflation) 
and the growth rate g as drawings from a bi-variate normal distribution.  The Ramsey equation implies 
that realisations for r and g together support a linear combination for ρ and η.  As a result, the bi-
variate distribution for r and g implies a degenerate bi-variate distribution for ρ and η.  Panel B of 
Figure 3 displays this distribution. The mean for η is 1.18, with a standard deviation of 0.80, but the 
distribution is right skewed with a mode of η = 0.55. The mean of ρ is 1.4%, with a standard deviation 
of 0.9%; the distribution is again right-skewed, this time with a mode of ρ = 0.9%.  The characteristics 
of this distribution are not inconsistent with the underlying distributions reported by Evans and Sezer, 
but it does clearly differ in shape. The second row of Table 1 shows the sensitivity of E(SCC) 
estimates to the difference.  Ignoring uncertainty and equity, E(SCC) = $41/tC; it is much higher than 
the estimate reported in the first row from the Evans and Sezer distribution because lower values of ρ 
 
3 Note that we trim the top and bottom .1% of results. 
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and η are deemed more likely.  As before, considering either equity or uncertainty increases the 
E(SCC), this time to $59/tC and $117/tC, respectively.  The effects of equity and uncertainty are now 
less pronounced because extreme values of ρ and η receive lower probability mass than before.  
Finally, as before, uncertainty dominates equity. However, in this case, equity moderates uncertainty; 
considering both simultaneously produces an estimate for E(SCC) of $228/tC. Again, equity and 
uncertainty reinforce one another. 
The third row of Table 1 shows E(SCC) estimates for a combined probability density function 
of ρ and η produced by multiplying the two PDFs in Figure 3 and rescaling them to integrate to unity. 
The estimates lie in between the previous results, but closer to the initial results derived from the 
Evans and Sezer PDF. The qualitative pattern is the same, though.  Uncertainty dominates, and is 
reinforced by equity.  Combining all of this information, our final estimate is E(SCC) = $206/tC. 
Lord Stern18 has expressed a preference for debating philosophically about the appropriate 
discount rate for the benefits of mitigation.  We bow out of that debate by exploring the ramifications 
of actual decision makers and actual developed economies.  We find that aversion to risk aversion is as 
important in determining SCC estimates as time preference.  More specifically, we offer high 
estimates for the SCC given operational combinations of risk aversion and time preference even with a 
model that incorporates relative conservative damage estimates (including benefits early) and 
autonomous adaptation drive by regional economic development.  
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Figure 1. The marginal damage cost of carbon emissions as a function of the rate of time 
preference and the rate of risk aversion.   
 
Panel A (top left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates without equity weighting and without 
uncertainty; low pure rates of time preference and risk aversion produce high SCC estimates because 
they work exclusively through the discount rate.  Panel B (top right) shows the sensitivity of SCC 
estimates to uncertainty without equity weighting; low rates of time preference produce higher 
estimates, but uncertainty dominates especially for high levels of risk aversion where the associated 
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risk premium climbs enormously.  Panel C ( bottom left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates to 
equity weighting derived from the “inequity aversion) interpretation of η and without uncertainty; 
higher aversions to inequity reduce the SCC for any time preference because the positive gains in 
developing countries from CO2 fertilization dominate “downstream” losses that are, by virtue of the 
higher values for η, discounted more severely.  Panel D (bottom right) shows the sensitivity of SCC 
estimates to equity weighting with uncertainty fully represented; the moderating effect of higher values 
for η is dominated by the effect of uncertainty. 
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Figure 2. The SCC as a function of the rate of time preference (green diamonds for a rate of risk 
aversion of 1.0), the rate of risk aversion (red squares for a rate of time preference of 2.0), and of the 
rate to time preference (blue triangles for a rate of risk aversion adjusted to maintain the discount rate 
at 5.0 assuming that consumption grows at 2.0% per year – right axis). 
 
Panel A (top left) shows contours without equity weighting and without uncertainty.  Negative values 
for SCC are possible for high rates of risk aversion and/or time preference (and guaranteed for a 5% 
discount rate); this is an indication of the conservative damage estimates embodied in FUND.  Panel B 
(top right) displays contours with η working as a risk aversion parameter given complete manifestation 
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of uncertainty but ignoring its role as equity weighting parameter at any point in time; the U-shaped 
contour associated with risk aversion is particularly instructive – the discounting effect of high values 
is dominated by the risk-premium effect of increased aversion to risk.  Panel C (bottom left) shows 
contours with η working to produce equity weights without uncertainty; the early agricultural benefits 
of CO2 fertilization in developing countries produces negative estimates for SCC for high discount 
rates born of high rates of risk aversion and/or time preference.  Panel D (bottom right) allows η to 
work both as a source of equity weighting and as a measure of risk aversion given climate and socio-
economic uncertainty; the U-shaped contours of the uncertainty only case from Panel B return. 
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Figure 3. Probability density functions of risk aversion and time preference  
 
Panel A displays the distribution reported by Evans and Sezer.  Panel B was derived from the Ramsey 
rule using OECD data. 
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Table 1. Estimates of the Expected Social Cost of Carbon ($/tC). 
 
 
Uncertainty Included? 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Equity weighting Included? 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Rate of pure time preference and rate of risk  
aversion from Evans and Sezer 
 
-0.7 
 
12.6
 
210.1
 
61.6 
 
 
Inference from interest rate and consumption 
growth rates from OECD countries 
  
40.6
 
58.7
 
227.8
 
117.4
 
 
Both 
 
-0.4 
 
13.2
 
205.5
 
60.7 
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APPENDICES 
 
A.  A utility-based rationale for Equation (1) 
To uncover the utility-based interpretation of the Ramsey (1928) optimal saving rule, consider a two 
period environment wherein inter-temporal discounted utility is given by 
(S1) ( ) ( ) ( )21 2 1, 1
U C
U C C U C ρ= + +  
with Ct indicating consumption in period t (t = 1,2).  Totally differentiating this relationship defines an 
inter-temporal marginal rate substitution (i.e., the rate at which an individual would trade current 
consumption for future consumption while maintaining the same level of discounted utility): 
(S2) ( )( )
( )
( )
1 12
1 2 1*
' ' (1 ) (1 ) 1
' 1 ' (1 ) (1 )U U
U C U CC g
C U C U C g g
ρ ρ ρ ηρ η η=
+∂ += ≈ = ≈ +∂ + − − +  
The interpretation in the text – that the Ramsey rule can be interpreted as representing the sum of an 
impatience effect and the effect of diminishing marginal utility with increasing consumption – 
follows. 
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 B. FUND details including website address. 
This paper uses version 3.0 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution 
(FUND). Version 3.0 of FUND corresponds to version 1.615,18,20, except for the impact module.10,16,17 
TA full list of papers, the source code and the technical documentation for the model can be found on 
line at http://www.fundmodel.org/. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations. The model 
distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America, Canada, Western 
Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former 
Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, 
North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time 
steps of one year. The prime reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact 
module. In FUND, the impacts of climate change are assumed to depend on the impact of the previous 
year, this way reflecting the process of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial values to be 
used for the year 1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical and monetized impacts of 
climate change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of the model runs. The 22nd and 23rd 
centuries are included to assess the long-term implications of climate change. Previous versions of the 
model stopped at 2200. 
The period of 1950-2000 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the IMAGE 100-
year database1. The scenario for the period 2010-2100 is based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, 
which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f9. The 2000-2010 period is interpolated from the 
immediate past (http://earthtrends.wri.org), and the period 2100-2300 extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, autonomous energy 
efficiency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of the energy use (autonomous carbon 
efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change, methane and 
nitrous oxide. 
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of climatic change. 
Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that result from changes in heat 
stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and cold stress are assumed to have an effect 
only on the elderly, non-reproductive population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect 
the number of births. Heat stress only affects the urban population. The share of the urban population 
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among the total population is based on the World Resources Databases (http://earthtrends.wri.org). It 
is extrapolated based on the statistical relationship between urbanization and per-capita income, which 
are estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995. Climate-induced migration between the 
regions of the world also causes the population sizes to change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate 
immediately and completely with the respective host population. 
The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy6. Consumption and investment are 
reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change reduces long-term economic 
growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the short-term. Economic growth is also 
reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures. The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon 
intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be accelerated by 
abatement policies, an option not considered in this paper. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride, the global mean temperature, the impact of carbon dioxide 
emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the impact of the damages to the economy 
and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the 
atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, 
measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by the five-box model7,11. The model also 
contains sulphur emissions19. 
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride and sulphur 
aerosols is as in the IPCC13. The global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric build-up to its 
equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing RF), with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the 
global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. 
Regional temperature follows from multiplying the global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which 
corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs12. The global mean sea 
level is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 
years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and 
sea level for the IS92a scenario8. 
The climate impact module16,17 includes the following categories: agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, 
cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, 
schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. 
 20
Climate change related damages can be attributed to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 
0.04°C/yr) or the level of change (benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature 
change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation17. 
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they can migrate 
because of sea level rise. Like all impacts of climate change, these effects are monetized. The value of 
a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita income. The resulting value of a statistical 
life lies in the middle of the observed range of values in the literature2. The value of emigration is set 
to be 3 times the per capita income14, the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income 
in the host region2. Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are modelled explicitly. The 
monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was on average $4 million in OECD 
countries in 19905. Dryland value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometre. 
Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 19905. The 
wetland value is assumed to have logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection is based on 
cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes 
and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and ecosystems, are directly 
expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts measured in their ‘natural’ 
units16. Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and 
respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a 
variety of factors, including plant physiology and the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive or 
negative depending on whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that 
optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the 
optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential impacts. The 
actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of 
not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative17. 
The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, water resources, 
diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple power functions. Impacts 
are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign17.  
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and technological 
progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water resources (with 
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population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and ecosystems and health (with higher 
per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy 
consumption (with technological progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and 
water-borne diseases (with improved health care) 17. The income elasticities 17 are estimated from 
cross-sectional data. 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is estimated by running the model twice, perturbed and unperturbed. 
In the perturbed run, an additional one million metric tonnes of carbon are emitted in each year 
between 2001 and 2010. The difference in impacts is computed and discounted back to the year 2000, 
using the discount rate as specified in Equation (S2). The difference is then divided by 10 mln tC to 
obtain an incremental cost estimate. That is, 
(S3) 
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where 
• SCCr is the regional social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
• r denotes region; 
• t and s denote time (in years); 
• I are monetised impacts (in US dollar per year); 
• E are emissions (in metric tonnes of carbon); 
• δ are additional emissions (in metric tonnes of carbon); 
• ρ is the pure rate of time preference (in fraction per year); 
• η is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption; and 
• g is the growth rate of per capita consumption (in fraction per year). 
We first compute the SCC per region, and then aggregate, as follows 
(S4) 
16
2000,
1 2000,
world
r r
Y
SCC SCC
Y
ε
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ r  
where 
• SCC is the global social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
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• SCCr is the regional social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
• r denotes region; 
• Yworld is the global average per capita consumption (in US dollar per person per year); 
• Yr is the regional average per capita consumption (in US dollar per person per year); and 
• ε is the rate of inequity aversion; ε=0 in the case without equity weighing; ε=η in the case with 
equity weighing. 
In the case of uncertainty, we compute the expected value of the SCC, as follows: 
(S5) 
1
E( ) ( )i
i
SCC SCC
MC
1 MC θ
=
= ∑  
where 
• E(SCC) is the expected value of the social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
• i indexes the Monte Carlo run; 
• MC is the number of Monte Carlo runs; MC = 1000; and 
• θ is the vector of uncertain input parameters, fully specified on http://www.fundmodel.org/ 
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 C. The rate of risk aversion, the pure rate of time preference, and the discount rate 
 
We compute the SCC and the E(SCC) for a range of the pure rate of time preference (ρ) and the rate of 
risk aversion (η), and we also compute a weighted average using three alternative bivariate PDFs for ρ 
and η, as follows: 
(S6) * ( , ) ( , )dSCC SCC f dρ η ρ η ρ
Η Ρ
= ∫ ∫ η  
The first bi-variate PDF of ρ and η assumes that these parameters are normally distributed with 
μρ=1.08%, μη=1.49, σρ=0.20%, ση=0.19 and σρη=0. See Table S1. The second bi-variate PDF is 
degenerate. It corresponds to a bi-variate normal PDF of r and g with μr=3.45%, μg=2.70, σr=2.56%, 
σg=1.61 and σrg=0 (see Table S2) and r = ρ + ηg. The third bi-variate PDF is the convolution of the 
first two. 
Table S1. Data on the rates of pure time preference and risk aversion. 
 ρ g ηa ηb 
Australia* 1.5 1.9 1.4 1.7 
Austria 1.0 2.7 1.6 1.6 
Belgium 1.0 2.3 1.5 1.6 
Czech Rep 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Denmark 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Finland 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.6 
France 0.9 1.8 1.3 1.3 
Germany 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.5 
Greece 1.0 2.5 1.7 1.5 
Hungary 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.4 
Ireland 0.8 3.0 1.6 2.0 
Italy 1.0 2.5 1.5 1.4 
Japan* 1.5 2.5 1.4 1.4 
Luxembourg 0.9 2.5 1.8 1.8 
The Netherlands 0.9 1.8 1.5 1.6 
Poland 1.0 4.6 1.1 1.1 
Portugal 1.0 2.7 1.6 1.7 
Slovakia 1.1 3.7 1.6 1.5 
Spain 1.0 2.3 1.6 1.6 
Sweden 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.4 
UK 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 
USA* 1.5 2.2 1.3 1.4 
 
Mean 1.08 2.30 1.46 1.51
St dev 0.20 0.79 0.19 0.19
a Risk aversion evaluated at the average wage. 
b Average risk aversion evaluated at a range of wages. 
Sources: 4 and 3*. 
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 Table S2. Data on the growth rate of per capita income and the real rate of interest. 
 Per capita growtha Real interestb Corr N Year 
 mean St dev Mean St dev   first last 
Australia 2.42 0.88 3.25 3.63 0.28 30 1971 2005 
Austria 1.99 0.99 3.54 1.22 0.19 16 1990 2006 
Belgium 2.44 1.47 3.85 2.42 -0.29 33 1970 2005 
Canada 2.48 1.41 3.56 2.58 0.08 32 1970 2005 
Czech Rep 4.45 1.68 2.45 1.06 -0.08 5 2001 2005 
Denmark 1.90 1.30 4.16 1.91 0.09 18 1988 2006 
Finland 3.58 1.33 4.60 1.96 0.32 14 1988 2005 
France 2.17 1.37 3.58 2.10 -0.21 34 1970 2005 
Germany 2.46 1.28 3.86 1.25 -0.01 32 1970 2006 
Greece 3.86 0.51 1.86 1.32 -0.20 9 1998 2006 
Iceland 4.03 1.57 5.65 1.60 0.09 9 1995 2005 
Ireland 4.80 2.68 3.25 3.40 0.21 28 1976 2005 
Italy 1.57 0.98 3.90 2.03 0.31 12 1993 2006 
Japan 1.98 1.25 2.60 0.87 0.03 13 1989 2005 
Korea 4.39 1.36 2.30 1.11 -0.24 5 2001 2005 
Luxembourg 3.69 2.23 2.83 1.78 0.03 11 1995 2005 
Netherlands 2.46 1.09 3.51 2.20 -0.23 32 1970 2006 
New Zealand 2.46 1.59 2.67 3.88 -0.20 26 1970 2005 
Norway 2.39 1.33 4.86 1.65 0.20 20 1985 2005 
Poland 4.17 1.84 4.47 1.11 -0.51 5 2001 2005 
Portugal 2.35 1.65 3.07 2.12 0.73 11 1994 2005 
Slovak Rep 5.55 1.67 -0.15 2.94 -0.23 5 2001 2005 
Spain 2.63 1.33 3.84 2.46 0.32 25 1981 2006 
Sweden 2.61 1.25 5.00 1.79 -0.10 16 1987 2005 
Switzerland 1.87 1.13 1.50 1.66 -0.04 27 1970 2005 
UK 2.82 1.20 3.22 3.72 -0.02 30 1970 2005 
USA 2.76 1.27 3.28 2.39 0.18 30 1970 2005 
         
Total 2.70 1.61 3.45 2.56 0.01 528 1970 2006 
a Gross domestic product (expenditure approach) per capita in constant prices. 
b Long-term interest rate minus the percentage change in the consumer price index (all items). 
Source: OECD.Stat Monthly Economic Indicators (http://stats.oecd.org) 
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D. The impact of CO2 fertilization on the social cost of carbon. 
 
In the main text, we find that social cost of carbon is positive for a high value of η if equity weighing 
is included and uncertainty is not. We assert that this is because of CO2 fertilization of agriculture, 
which has large benefits in developing countries in the short term. High values of eta emphasize these 
benefits. In order to test this assertion, we reran the model with the CO2 fertilization switched of. 
Figure S1 compares the results. With CO2 fertilization, the SCC falls with rising η. Without CO2 
fertilization, the SCC first falls (as the discount rate increases) but then starts rising (as the rising 
discount rate is more than compensated by the increasing equity weights). 
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 Panel A      Panel B 
Figure S1. The SCC as a function of the rate of time preference (green diamonds for a rate of risk 
aversion of 1.0), the rate of risk aversion (red squares for a rate of time preference of 2.0), and of the 
rate to time preference (blue triangles for a rate of risk aversion adjusted to maintain the discount 
rate at 5.0 assuming that consumption grows at 2.0% per year). 
 
Both panels show contours with equity weights but without uncertainty. Panel A includes the 
immediate, positive effects of CO2 fertilization on agriculture across the world, whereas Panel B 
assumes no CO2 fertilization. Panel A equals Figure 2, Panel C (rescaled). 
 26
  
Reference List 
 
 1 J. J. Batjes and C. G. M. Goldewijk, The IMAGE 2 Hundred Year (1890-1990) Database of the 
Global Environment (HYDE), Report No. 410100082, RIVM, Bilthoven, 1994. 
 2 W. R. Cline, Global Warming - The Benefits of Emission Abatement,  OECD, Paris, 1992. 
 3 Evans, D. J. and Sezer, H., "Social Discount Rates for Six Major Countries," Applied 
Economics Letters 11, 557-560 (2004). 
 4 Evans, D. J. and Sezer, H., "Social Discount Rates for Member Countries of the European 
Union," Journal of Economic Studies 32(1), 47-59 (2005). 
 5 Fankhauser, Samuel, "Protection vs. Retreat -- The Economic Costs of Sea Level Rise," 
Environment and Planning A 27, 299-319 (1994). 
 6 Fankhauser, Samuel and Tol, R. S. J., "On climate change and economic growth," Resource and 
Energy Economics 27, 1-17 (2005). 
 7 Hammitt, J. K., Lempert, R. J., and Schlesinger, M. E., "A Sequential-Decision Strategy for 
Abating Climate Change," Nature 357, 315-318 (1992). 
 8 A. Kattenberg, et al., "Climate Models - Projections of Future Climate,"in Climate Change 
1995: The Science of Climate Change -- Contribution of Working Group I to the Second 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1 ed. edited by J. 
T. Houghton, et al. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp.285-357. 
 9 J. Leggett, W. J. Pepper, and R. J. Swart, "Emissions Scenarios for the IPCC: An Update,"in 
Climate Change 1992 - The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment, 1 
ed. edited by J. T. Houghton, B. A. Callander, and S. K. Varney (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992), pp.71-95. 
 27
 10 Link, P. M. and Tol, R. S. J., "Possible economic impacts of a shutdown of the thermohaline 
circulation: an application of FUND," Portuguese Economic Journal 3, 99-114 (2004). 
 11 Maier-Reimer, E. and Hasselmann, K., "Transport and Storage of Carbon Dioxide in the Ocean: 
An Inorganic Ocean Circulation Carbon Cycle Model," Climate Dynamics 2, 63-90 
(1987). 
 12 Mendelsohn, Robert O., Morrison, Wendy N., Schlesinger, M. E., and Andronova, N. G., 
"Country-specific market impacts of climate change," Climatic Change 45, 553-569 
(2000). 
 13 V. Ramaswamy, et al., "Radiative Forcing of Climate Change,"in Climate Change 2001: The 
Scientific Basis -- Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by J. T. Houghton and Y. Ding 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001), pp.349-416. 
 14 Tol, R. S. J., "The Damage Costs of Climate Change Toward More Comprehensive 
Calculations," Environmental and Resource Economics 5, 353-374 (1995). 
 15 Tol, R. S. J., "Equitable Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change," Ecological Economics 
36(1), 71-85 (2001). 
 16 Tol, R. S. J., "Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change - Part 1: Benchmark 
Estimates," Environmental and Resource Economics 21, 47-73 (2002). 
 17 Tol, R. S. J., "Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change - Part II: Dynamic Estimates," 
Environmental and Resource Economics 21, 135-160 (2002). 
 18 Tol, R. S. J., "Welfare Specifications and Optimal Control of Climate Change: an Application of 
FUND," Energy Economics 24, 367-376 (2002). 
 19 Tol, R. S. J., "Multi-Gas Emission Reduction for Climate Change Policy: An Application of 
FUND," Energy Journal (Multi-Greenhouse Gas Mitigation and Climate Policy Special 
Issue), 235-250 (2006). 
 28
 29
 20 R. S. J. Tol, Thomas E. Downing, and N. Eyre, The Marginal Costs of Radiatively-Active Gases, 
Report No. W99/32, Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 
1999. 
 
 
Year Number 
Title/Author(s) 
ESRI Authors/Co-authors Italicised 
   
2008 251 The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Economic Growth 
and Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Ireland 
  Thomas Conefrey, John D. Fitz Gerald, Laura 
Malaguzzi Valeri and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 250 The Distributional Implications of a Carbon Tax in 
Ireland 
  Tim Callan, Sean Lyons, Susan Scott, Richard S.J. 
Tol and Stefano Verde 
   
 249 Measuring Material Deprivation in the Enlarged EU 
  Christopher T. Whelan, Brian Nolan and Bertrand 
Maître 
   
 248 Marginal Abatement Costs on Carbon-Dioxide 
Emissions: A Meta-Analysis 
  Onno Kuik, Luke Brander and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 247 Incorporating GHG Emission Costs in the Economic 
Appraisal of Projects Supported by State 
Development Agencies 
  Richard S.J. Tol and Seán Lyons 
   
 246 A Carton Tax for Ireland 
  Richard S.J. Tol, Tim Callan, Thomas Conefrey, 
John D. Fitz Gerald, Seán Lyons, Laura Malaguzzi 
Valeri and Susan Scott 
   
 245 Non-cash Benefits and the Distribution  of 
Economic Welfare 
  Tim Callan and Claire Keane 
   
 244 Scenarios of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Aviation 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 243 The Effect of the Euro on Export Patterns: 
Empirical Evidence from Industry Data 
  Gavin Murphy and Iulia Siedschlag  
   
 242 The Economic Returns to Field of Study and 
Competencies Among Higher Education Graduates 
in Ireland 
  Elish Kelly, Philip O’Connell and Emer Smyth 
   
 30
   
 241 European Climate Policy and Aviation Emissions 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 240 Aviation and the Environment in the Context of the 
EU-US Open Skies Agreement 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 239 Yuppie Kvetch? Work-life Conflict and Social Class 
in Western Europe 
  Frances McGinnity and Emma Calvert 
   
 238 Immigrants and Welfare Programmes: Exploring 
the Interactions between Immigrant 
Characteristics, Immigrant Welfare Dependence 
and Welfare Policy 
  Alan Barrett and Yvonne McCarthy 
   
 237 How Local is Hospital Treatment? An Exploratory 
Analysis of Public/Private Variation in Location of 
Treatment in Irish Acute Public Hospitals  
  Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
   
 236 The Immigrant Earnings Disadvantage Across the 
Earnings and Skills Distributions: The Case of 
Immigrants from the EU’s New Member States in 
Ireland 
  Alan Barrett, Seamus McGuinness and Martin 
O’Brien 
   
 235 Europeanisation of Inequality and European 
Reference Groups 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 234 Managing Capital Flows: Experiences from Central 
and Eastern Europe 
  Jürgen von Hagen and Iulia Siedschlag 
   
 233 ICT Diffusion, Innovation Systems, Globalisation 
and Regional Economic Dynamics: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence 
  Charlie Karlsson, Gunther Maier, Michaela Trippl, 
Iulia Siedschlag, Robert Owen and Gavin Murphy 
   
 232 Welfare and Competition Effects of Electricity 
Interconnection between Great Britain and Ireland 
  Laura Malaguzzi Valeri 
   
 31
   
 231 Is FDI into China Crowding Out the FDI into the 
European Union? 
  Laura Resmini and Iulia Siedschlag 
   
 230 Estimating the Economic Cost of Disability in 
Ireland 
  John Cullinan, Brenda Gannon and Seán Lyons 
   
 229 Controlling the Cost of Controlling the Climate: The 
Irish Government’s Climate Change Strategy 
  Colm McCarthy, Sue Scott 
   
 228 The Impact of Climate Change on the Balanced-
Growth-Equivalent: An Application of FUND 
  David Anthoff, Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 227 Changing Returns to Education During a Boom? 
The Case of Ireland 
  Seamus McGuinness, Frances McGinnity, Philip 
O’Connell 
   
 226 ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Social Risks: Life Cycle and Social 
Class Perspectives on Social Exclusion in Ireland 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 225 The Climate Preferences of Irish Tourists by 
Purpose of Travel 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 224 A Hirsch Measure for the Quality of Research 
Supervision, and an Illustration with Trade 
Economists 
  Frances P. Ruane and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 223 Environmental Accounts for the Republic of 
Ireland: 1990-2005 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
2007 222 Assessing Vulnerability of Selected Sectors under 
Environmental Tax Reform: The issue of pricing 
power 
  J. Fitz Gerald, M. Keeney and S. Scott 
   
 221 Climate Policy Versus Development Aid 
Richard S.J. Tol 
   
   
 32
   
 220 Exports and Productivity – Comparable Evidence 
for 14 Countries 
  The International Study Group on Exports and 
Productivity 
   
 219 Energy-Using Appliances and Energy-Saving 
Features: Determinants of Ownership in Ireland 
  Joe O’Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 218 The Public/Private Mix in Irish Acute Public 
Hospitals: Trends and Implications 
Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
   
 217 Regret About the Timing of First Sexual 
Intercourse: The Role of Age and Context 
Richard Layte, Hannah McGee 
   
 216 Determinants of Water Connection Type and 
Ownership of Water-Using Appliances in Ireland 
Joe O’Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 215 Unemployment – Stage or Stigma? 
Being Unemployed During an Economic Boom 
Emer Smyth 
   
 214 The Value of Lost Load 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 213 Adolescents’ Educational Attainment and School 
Experiences in Contemporary Ireland 
Merike Darmody, Selina McCoy, Emer Smyth 
   
 212 Acting Up or Opting Out? Truancy in Irish 
Secondary Schools 
Merike Darmody, Emer Smyth and Selina McCoy 
   
 211 Where do MNEs Expand Production: Location 
Choices of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe 
after 1992 
Frances P. Ruane, Xiaoheng Zhang 
   
 210 Holiday Destinations: Understanding the Travel 
Choices of Irish Tourists 
Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
   
   
 33
 34
 209 The Effectiveness of Competition Policy and the 
Price-Cost Margin: Evidence from Panel Data 
Patrick McCloughan, Seán Lyons and William Batt 
   
 208 Tax Structure and Female Labour Market 
Participation: Evidence from Ireland 
Tim Callan, A. Van Soest, J.R. Walsh 
   
 207 Distributional Effects of Public Education Transfers 
in Seven European Countries 
Tim Callan, Tim Smeeding and Panos Tsakloglou 
 
